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Abstract. 
In Uttar Pradesh, teams of four are engaged to dig soil under the NREGA 
programme. In one treatment spouses work together; in the other treatment they 
work in separate teams. Working with spouses is associated with significantly 
higher output.  
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1. Introduction 
Does working alongside friends or relations lower or raise productivity? We 
supplement evidence on the issue through a field experiment in Uttar Pradesh, 
India conducted with married couples. Teams of four are engaged to dig soil. In 
one treatment husbands and wives work together; in the other treatment they 
work in separate teams. We find that working with spouses is associated with 
significantly higher team productivity.  
 
2. Background. 
There are two main motives for the experiment. Some recent work in personnel 
economics examines the impact of non-work relationships on workplace 
productivity (e.g. Mas and Moretti, 2009, Bandiera et al, 2005). This literature 
focuses largely on non-related acquaintances, but particularly in developing 
countries, family members often work alongside one another on farms and 
enterprises (Haddad et al., 1997). Since family members often pool some or all of 
their resources within the household, the response to working with relatives 
might be quite different to the effect of working with non-relatives with whom 
income is not shared. Some evidence is called for. The other motive concerns 
experiments on household decision-making. Recent experiments have found 
significant impacts on spousal behaviour from playing games together (Peters et 
al. 2004), making decisions together (Bateman and Munro, 2005, de Palma et al, 
2011, Carlsson et al, 2012) or altering the information shared between partners 
(Ashraf, 2009, Iversen et al, 2011) in laboratory-like settings. For the sake of 
external validity, it is useful to see whether spousal behaviour is sensitive to 
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context in more natural settings1 and in particular, when rewards are earned 
through actual labour. 
 
The experiment was conducted by financing actual work within the rules of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), a workfare programme 
designed to alleviate poverty in rural India. Each NREGA worker must pre-
register to receive a job card with a specific code number which can be shared 
between spouses. Women in NREGA often face significant impediments in their 
attempts to benefit from the scheme. Nevertheless, there are many examples 
where women are allowed to work and do work alongside men, albeit often with a 
gendered division of labour (Khera and Nayak, 2009). 
 
3. Methodology  
The work was the complementary tasks of digging of soil by men and the 
transporting and dumping of soil by women to improve existing ponds. Because 
we wished to compare the effects of working with a spouse to the effect of 
working alone, we needed treatments in which men worked with women to whom 
they were not married. Mixed sex teams of two would have produced strong 
cultural resistance, so we created teams of four with two males and two females. 
All individuals were paid on the basis of the team performance, as measured by 
the volume of soil successfully removed. In treatment one (the control) each team 
of four consisted of 2 men and 2 women, none of whom were married to one 
another. However, for one man and one woman their spouses were working in 
another site nearby under the same conditions. In treatment two, teams also 
contained 2 men and 2 women but in this case two members of each team were 
                                                 
1 With features such as onsite assignment to treatment and the presence of non-local supervisors, we do 
not claim this was a natural field experiment. 
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spouses. The other two individuals were not married to one another or to anyone 
else taking part in the experiment. The team members were paid at the rate of 
Rs 2 per cubic foot of soil successfully removed from the site and dumped, subject 
to local NREGA rules that dictate a minimum wage of Rs100 per working day.2  
 
The fieldwork was carried out in five sites (Samaspur, Madiya and Mowiya, 
Katwarupur and Manghipur) in three culturally homogeneous blocks of rural 
Uttar Pradesh (UP). Prior to the experiment a sample of 540 workers, stratified 
by sex and status (registered couples and non-registered) were randomly selected 
from the local NREGA registers and invited to take part. Out of these 516 
participated, with 129 married couples, 129 male and 129 female unaccompanied 
participants.3   The experiments were carried out over 4 days: digging at Madiya 
and Mowiya were carried out on the same day to prevent contamination of data 
between the adjacent villages.   
 
On a game day the participants were ticked for presence and randomly assigned 
to treatment. Each team was taken separately to its designated spot, briefed on 
the rules, assigned a standardized area to dig and given a timed 3.5 hours to 
work. The teams were asked to dump the mud at an assigned site 15-20 walking 
steps from each pit. After work stopped the experimenter publicly measured the 
length, breadth and height of the pit. Earnings were calculated and team 
members paid-off individually in cash.  
 
                                                 
2 Only 7 out of 86 teams fell below this 50 cubic feet threshold and results reported below 
are not significantly affected by the inclusion of this group. 
3 Following NREGA rules an additional six workers were designated for water provision at 
each site.   
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In this context, when the spouses are separated as in treatment 1, they cannot 
coordinate their efforts. When they play in the same game, they can coordinate. 
Typically, therefore we would expect that, for players from a cooperative 
household average output will be higher when spouses play together than when 
apart. However, male and female effort is complementary in this game, meaning 
that there may be multiple Nash equilibria.  Treatment may move play from one 
equilibrium to another. Additionally, the appropriate household model may not 
be a cooperative one and this may lead to different behaviour between treatments 
(Ashraf, 2009). It is therefore theoretically conceivable that output is lower when 
spouses work in the same team. 
 
4. Results. 
In each of the two treatments there were 172 participants making 86 teams of 
four. 4   Table 1 sets out basic information obtained in an ex-post survey. In 
addition to obvious questions such as age, land-owned, education and social 
group, we asked individuals about the time they typically spend working with 
their spouses in a standard week. We also asked them to specify how many 
members of their team were known to them prior to the experiment. In Table 1, 
mean responses do not differ significantly between treatments. 
Table 1 here 
The key result is summarized in figure 1 which shows the distribution of output 
for the two treatments. The frequency scale reports the number of individuals in 
each output class. Mean group output was 169 for treatment 2 and 111.9 for 
treatment 0, a difference of approximately 50% and we reject the hypothesis of no 
treatment effect at the 1% level (Mann-Whitney test on teams, z=4.024, p<0.001).  
                                                 
4 172 participants were randomly assigned to another treatment and are not discussed in 
this paper. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of output by treatment. 
 
Table 2 summarizes regression results using only the data for couples where both 
spouses took part in the field experiment. The first equation has dummies for 
treatment 2 and the locations. The second equation has a fuller set of control 
variables. It contains an interactive term with hours in the week spent working 
together and there are also two variables for the age of the oldest male and 
female member of the team and a dummy variable which equals 1 only if the 
couple have a joint account for NREGA payments. The key result is the same as 
that shown in figure 1: mean output is higher in the treatment when couples 
work together.  
 
Most controls are not significant, but sites show significantly lower output than 
Samaspur, a feature possibly explained by higher temperatures at these sites 
and harder soil conditions. The coefficients on time working and the interactive 
term have opposite signs and the absolute values are not significantly different 
from one another. In other words generally, couples who work more often 
together in daily life have higher productivity. However, for these couples, the 
impact of treatment is weaker. The number of known players in the game is also 
positively associated with productivity, while a higher value for the age of the 
oldest female in the group is associated with lower output. Finally, separate 
NREGA bank accounts are associated with higher productivity. 
Table 2 here. 
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5. Conclusions and discussion. 
In a poor region of rural India, we find that teams with paired couples 
consistently outperform teams where spouses are separated from their partners. 
The output gap between the two systems is large, by approximately 50%, a result 
consistent with a simple cooperative household model. We do not know the extent 
to which our results generalize from a particular context, but it is notable that, in 
contrast to some of the recent work on social connections and the workplace, we 
also find a positive relationship between output and other kinds of social contact.  
A feature of our results is that couples who work together more frequently 
outside the experiment are more productive and less sensitive to treatment. It is 
possible that in this locale, spouses who do not work regularly together are more 
strategic within their marital relationship compared to spouses who work 
together. That is, spouses who do not work together, shirk when not being 
observed by their partners.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of output by treatment. 
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Table 1. Summary of Means. 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 
Age (years) 38.2 40.0 
Land owned (acres) 0.22 0.14 
Household size 6.3 6.5 
Of which aged 15-60 3.2 3.6 
Cast and Tribe (%)   
Scheduled caste  50.9 68.4 
Scheduled tribe  2.92 1.17 
Other backward caste 37.4 24.6 
Upper caste 0.0 0.0 
Other 8.77 5.85 
Number in team known to you 2.37 2.2 
Education level, female  1.18 1.13 
Education level, male 1.79 1.63 
Hours spent working with spouse per week 37.7 33.3 
N 172 172 
Education:  1 = not literate, 2 = only primary school; 3 = secondary level or above. 
All variables are self-reported. 
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Table 2. Regression results (dependent variable = soil volume). 
 Site dummies only Full set of controls 
Constant 145.950*** 102.140*** 
 (10.432) (2.878) 
Treatment 58.000*** 111.333*** 
 (4.636) (3.567) 
Hours working together (per week)  1.206*** 
  (3.272) 
Treatment x Hours working together  -1.383*  
  (-1.780) 
Madiya -17.250  -52.297*** 
 (-1.065) (-2.777) 
Mowiya -63.117*** -79.518*** 
 (-3.047) (-4.112) 
Katwarupur -49.677*** -69.455*** 
 (-3.136) (-3.844) 
Manghipur -40.859*  -59.898*** 
 (-1.925) (-3.094) 
Scheduled Tribe  21.687  
  (0.527) 
OBC (“Other backward caste”)  4.204  
  (0.330) 
Other  -16.651  
  (-0.919) 
Known members of group  11.176*** 
  (2.835) 
Age  0.531  
  (0.958) 
Landholding  -6.244  
  (-0.650) 
Education   2.652  
  (0.516) 
Age of oldest female in group  -0.967**  
  (-2.202) 
Age of oldest male in group  -0.020  
  (-0.034) 
Separate bank accounts  32.673*** 
  (2.760) 
N 172 172 
R2 0.215 0.403 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Omitted category: Scheduled Caste. Standard 
errors clustered on teams. 
 
 
